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INTRODUCTION 
According to Edward Rock, the issue that has concerned scholars and 
practitioners of corporate governance and corporate law for decades, 
namely, the principal–agent problem between shareholders and managers, 
has been solved.1 It is yesterday’s problem and has already been addressed 
through a combination of increased shareholder activism and intensified 
executive remuneration. We should recognize this and move on to confront 
today’s problem. Rock asserts that today’s problem is the reemergence of an 
issue that used to be center stage in corporate law, namely, the conflict 
between shareholders and creditors. It is this conflict, rather than the 
shareholder–manager debate, that should be the focus of our attention going 
forward.2 
Barry Adler and Marcel Kahan take Rock’s thesis as a starting point for 
proposals to address the shareholder–creditor conflict.3 They argue that the 
problem is creditors’ inability to recover losses sustained as a consequence 
of firm misconduct in, for example, incurring excessive risks or additional 
debt liabilities that undermine the claims of earlier creditors.4 They believe 
that liability for such actions should rest with shareholders and subsequent 
creditors, rather than management, since these were the parties that encour-
aged and incentivized management to undertake them. They therefore 
argue that creditors should have the right to seek recovery from shareholders 
and later generations of creditors in compensation for their losses. In effect, 
they are proposing that creditors should be able to pierce the corporate veil 
and impose liability through direct claims against shareholders and subse-
quent creditors.5 This will, according to Adler and Kahan, discourage 
shareholders and creditors from promoting these damaging actions in the 
first place.6 
These thought-provoking and important Articles raise several funda-
mental questions about the nature of the corporation and the design of 
corporate governance and corporate law. The first question is whether 
 
1 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907, 1926 (2013).  
2 Id. at 1926-29.  
3 Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1773 (2013).  
4 Id. at Part III (discussing various deficiencies in remedies that are currently available to 
creditors).  
5 Id. at Part IV. 
6 See id. at 1803-04 (detailing the limiting effect that recovery against shareholders and sub-
sequent creditors has on inefficient investment). 
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Rock’s assertion that the traditional principal–agent problem has been 
solved and can be laid aside is correct. The second question, if he is right, is 
whether the creditor–shareholder conflict is the next issue that should be 
addressed. Finally, are Adler and Kahan then correct in suggesting that the 
problem’s resolution lies with shareholders and new creditors instead of 
with management, and should the problem then be addressed by allowing 
the affected parties to recover from shareholders and later creditors? 
This Response argues that Rock is fundamentally right in recognizing 
that we are using today’s policy tools to address yesterday’s corporate 
governance problems and that the traditional principal–agent issue is no 
longer the primary concern. Furthermore, an excessive preoccupation with 
this one issue has aggravated and caused, rather than rectified or extin-
guished, existing deficiencies of the corporation. Rock is therefore making 
an important contribution to the corporate governance debate by alerting us 
to this deficiency in the corporate governance literature. 
Adler and Kahan are also right to seek a resolution of the distortions 
through realigning incentives. Their suggestion of allowing creditors, under 
certain circumstances, to recover damages sustained from shareholders and 
other creditors is interesting and could play an important role in enabling 
corporations to expand the set of contractual relations that they can estab-
lish with their creditors and shareholders. 
This Response suggests that Rock should go further in recognizing the 
consequential nature of the problem that he identifies. It is but the tip of 
the iceberg, and in focusing on the tip Rock could cause us to crash into the 
mass that lies hidden below the surface. The problems created by an exces-
sive preoccupation with principal–agent matters are an illustration of this, 
but so too are Adler and Kahan’s proposals, which in turn risk creating new 
distortions. 
To properly address the problem that both Articles have correctly iden-
tified, we need an approach that recognizes the corporation’s full complexity 
and its potential to resolve its own failings without resorting to further 
private litigation or public regulation. To understand the strengths and 
weaknesses in Rock’s and Adler and Kahan’s proposals, we first need to put 
their important contributions in the context of the existing debate. 
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I. THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT DEBATE 
Since Berle and Means,7 increasing attention has been devoted to the 
consequences of the separation of ownership and control in dispersed 
shareholder corporations caused by the divergence of the shareholders’ and 
managers’ interests.8 Corporate governance in this traditional context has 
most recently been associated with the failures of institutions during the 
financial crisis.9 Egregious managerial conduct resulted in excessive risk-
taking that undermined the solvency of financial institutions to the detri-
ment of shareholders as well as creditors and governments. The solutions 
required to address this included better stewardship by shareholders; more 
accountability of management to the owners; a closer alignment of executive 
remuneration with corporate performance; and stronger oversight by 
auditors, risk management committees, and risk officers. The common 
theory was that by bringing managerial interests closer in line with those of 
shareholders, the management’s reckless conduct could have been avoided. 
In fact, in all likelihood the corporate governance failure was a result of 
exactly the opposite—an excessively close alignment of managerial interests 
with those of shareholders led management not to act in an uncontrolled 
fashion, but to respond recklessly to the incentives provided by shareholders. 
In holding “put options” on a firm, shareholders are the beneficiaries of 
excessive risk-taking because they derive benefits from the upside gains 
from risk-taking but impose the costs of failure on creditors. In highly 
leveraged institutions such as banks, shareholders benefit from the increased 
risk-taking, which augments the value of their call options on the firm. 
Banks that engage in high-risk investments benefit their shareholders by 
transferring wealth from their creditors to their shareholders.10  
 
7 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
8 For good surveys of the corporate governance literature, see Marco Becht et al., Corporate 
Governance and Control (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461, and, for a more recent summary, STEEN THOMSEN & 
MARTIN CONYON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: MECHANISMS AND SYSTEMS (2012). 
9 For a survey of the literature on bank governance and performance, see Marco Becht et al., 
Why Bank Governance Is Different, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 437 (2011). 
10 See Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some 
Banks Perform Better? 25 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2010-03-005, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572407 (finding, in a study of financial institutions, that “banks with a 
more shareholder-friendly board took more risks that worked out poorly”); Ing-Haw Cheng et al., 
Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 30 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 285/2010, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502762 (concluding that 
“shareholders’ goals determined the riskiness of financial firms’ strategies and that improving 
governance would not restrain risk-taking”).  
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This is a specific example of the general conflict between shareholders 
and creditors that Rock describes, namely, the misalignment of interests 
between the two parties. Creditors with fixed claims on firms wish them to 
maintain conservative, low-risk investment policies; as residual claimants, 
shareholders prefer high-risk investments, particularly when equity markets 
allow them to diversify their firm-specific risks across a large number of 
shareholdings. This conflict becomes more acute as leverage and the value 
of shareholders’ put options increase. 
In this context, as corporate governance—in its traditional manifestation 
of aligning shareholder and managerial interests—is strengthened, the 
problem becomes more—not less—acute. The stronger the alignment of 
managerial remuneration with shareholder earnings, the greater the incen-
tive on management to make the high-risk investments that shareholders 
wish to see implemented. Far from alleviating the source of the financial 
crisis, conventional policy prescriptions are therefore destined to intensify 
it.11 Not only, in Rock’s terms, have we solved yesterday’s corporate govern-
ance problem, but in the process we have created today’s. 
Neither of the resultant problems—the debt overhang and wealth transfer 
problems described in Section III—is new, and both have been extensively 
discussed.12 However, such has been the force of the shareholder lobby that 
we have lost sight of the other conflicts that pervade the corporation. The 
creditor–shareholder conflict is but one of many others, and in the process 
of reestablishing its significance, it is important to appreciate that it is by no 
means the only, or indeed necessarily the most, important one. 
II. THE SHAREHOLDER–SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT 
While the agency problem remains paramount, academic attention has 
shifted over the last decade to a different conflict between large and small 
(i.e., majority and minority) shareholders. Much of the recent corporate law 
literature has sought to strengthen the rights of minority shareholders 
against the pursuit of private interests by majority shareholders. This is 
 
11 See, e.g., Renée B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence 
for Large Bank Holding Companies, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 243, 245 (2012) (finding that board 
independence is not related to firm performance); Daniel Ferreira et al., Boards of Banks 8 (Eur. 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 289/2010, 2012), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1620551 (“[B]anks with more shareholder-oriented governance structures take more 
risks.”). 
12 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 343-51 (1976) (exploring the role of 
agency in corporate wealth maximization); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 
5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 147-49 (1977) (reviewing corporate debt policy theories). 
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regarded as critical to the participation of minority shareholders in capital 
markets. 
There is a still more important conflict among shareholders that is rising 
to the forefront in both academic and policy debates: the conflict between 
short- and long-term shareholders. Some regard “short-termism” as a 
particularly serious deficiency of Anglo-American capital markets.13 The 
problem of short-termism exists where market inefficiencies compel share-
holders who only hold their shares for short periods of time to encourage 
companies to exploit overvalued investments to the detriment of long-term 
shareholders.14 A preoccupation with short-term returns by some investors 
will therefore have consequences for firms’ real (i.e., physical and human 
capital) investment policies. 
In essence, both the majority–minority and the short–long term conflicts 
are manifestations of a generic problem that, in the absence of complete 
markets for which there are securities corresponding to all the potential 
states of the world, there will be a lack of unanimity amongst shareholders 
regarding the policies, both real and financial, that a firm should be pursuing. 
The creditor–shareholder conflict is a further extension of this generic 
problem to a context in which it is impossible to write complete contracts 
between the two parties. In essence, these conflicts are inherent to the 
corporation. As the shareholder–creditor case illustrates, seeking to rebalance 
the interests of one party not only undermines the position of the other 
party but also likely generates conflicts with third parties. So, for example, 
resolving the agency problem intensifies the creditor–shareholder conflict, 
and resolving the creditor–shareholder conflict might well exacerbate both 
the agency and majority–minority shareholder problems by weakening the 
power of shareholders and, in particular, minority shareholders. 
This example demonstrates the unintended consequences that corporate 
governance reforms can cause, and it warns against prescriptive recommen-
 
13 See, e.g., JOHN KAY, DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK 
EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING: FINAL REPORT 9, 14 (2012), available 
at http://bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-
report.pdf (defining “[s]hort-termism” as “the natural human tendency to make decisions in search 
of immediate gratification at the expense of future returns” and concluding that it “is a problem in 
UK equity markets”). 
14 See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative 
Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 598 (2006) (“In a speculative stock market, incumbent 
shareholders have a shorter horizon and align the manager’s horizon to theirs by weighing the 
CEO’s compensation more heavily on short-term stock price performance.”); Patrick Bolton et al., 
Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 
743 (2005) (suggesting that “directors, just as CEOs, should be encouraged to take a more long-
term perspective”). 
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dations that seek to impose the highest standards of corporate governance. 
There is no universally applicable manual for good corporate governance. 
Tradeoffs must be made to reflect the particular circumstances of each 
company. This is not to say that, because the corporation is riddled with 
conflicts, nothing can or should be done, but only that careful consideration 
needs to be given to the underlying causes of the conflicts and to the 
appropriate solutions, which may not lie in either law or regulation. It is 
against this background that we should consider Rock’s and Adler and 
Kahan’s specific suggestions that the most serious problem in corporate 
governance is currently the conflict between creditors and shareholders, and 
the appropriate solution is to allow recovery by creditors against shareholders 
and other creditors. 
III. THE CREDITOR–SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT 
The creditor–shareholder conflict is a debt overhang problem. There is 
outstanding debt that is exposed to the risk of corporate failure. However, 
unlike shareholders, creditors are protected by contract through covenants 
and collateral as well as the servicing of interest and principal. Private 
contract rather than public law is therefore viewed as the primary mecha-
nism for resolving the creditor–shareholder conflict. Where there are 
externalities in the form of potential systemic crises resulting from indi-
vidual firm failures, then public regulation may be required to internalize 
externalities. Absent such externalities, private contracting should be 
adequate. 
In practice, however, the power to enforce contractual provisions on debt 
contracts is limited. The financial crisis revealed the extent to which covenants 
were ineffective in preventing banks from substantially raising their finan-
cial exposure through increasing leverage and engaging in high-risk invest-
ments.15 Creditors have three forms of protection: equity capital, interest 
rate margins, and the refusal to lend. The price of inadequate creditor 
protection is higher costs of capital and credit rationing, as manifested by 
the collapse of credit markets in the post–financial crisis era.  
The strongest incentive on companies to desist from engaging in wealth 
transfers at the expense of creditors is their desire to access credit markets 
at low costs of finance. Companies that cannot demonstrate credible mecha-
nisms for doing this pay the price in terms of the costs and availability of 
 
15 See, e.g., Noel Yahanpath & SzeKee Koh, Strength of Bond Covenants and Bond Assessment 
Framework, 6 AUSTRALASIAN ACCT. BUS. & FIN. J., no. 2, 2012, at 71, 81-86  (recording the weakness 
of covenants in New Zealand bond issues between 2001 and 2007). 
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credit.16 The fact that the incidence of poor corporate governance is ultimately 
borne by users rather than suppliers of credit reflects the high elasticity of 
supply relative to demand for credit, in particular amongst small corporate 
borrowers. Investors have a vast array of alternative forms of investment; 
borrowers, in general, have comparatively limited sources of finance. In that 
regard, the welfare effects of ex post reneging through wealth transfers in 
credit markets might be modest—at least for the suppliers rather than the 
users of credit—in comparison to those of other stakeholders who face more 
inelastic supply schedules. 
IV. THE STAKEHOLDER–SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT 
Creditors are not the only stakeholders who are poorly protected by con-
tract. The same applies to most stakeholders in the firm—employees, 
suppliers, and customers. They have some contractual protection through 
employment, supply, and purchase contracts, respectively, but in each case 
the level of protection is limited. Furthermore, while the ex post exposure 
of these parties might be similar to that of creditors, their ex ante vulnera-
bility is frequently greater. Unlike financial investors who can readily take 
their capital elsewhere, employees, suppliers, and customers often have 
limited choice ex ante as well as ex post. They are therefore less able to 
respond to the possibility of contractual violations through, for example, 
refusal to supply or purchase. The incidence of wealth transfers is more 
likely to be borne by these other stakeholders than either shareholders or 
creditors to the firm. 
The implication is that once one considers parties beyond shareholders, 
the costs of poor corporate governance are less likely to be borne by creditors 
than other stakeholders. While Rock is therefore correct in concluding that 
creditor–shareholder conflicts are now more serious than those between 
shareholders and management, he should perhaps have gone on to consider 
the other parties that are potentially more at risk from wealth transfers than 
creditors. Alternatively, one should extend Rock’s concerns about creditors 
beyond financial forms of credit to creditors more broadly defined, including 
employees, suppliers, and purchasers.  
Having concluded that Rock might well be correct in suggesting that the 
main focus of corporate governance should move beyond shareholder–
manager relations to those between shareholders and creditors broadly 
 
16 See Gordon J. Alexander et al., What Does Nasdaq’s High-Yield Bond Market Reveal About 
Bondholder–Stockholder Conflicts?, 29 FIN. MGMT. 23, 36 (2000) (recording a “divergence in the 
returns of bonds and stocks when cumulative excess stock returns are negative”). 
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defined, the next question is what should be done about it. In particular, are 
Adler and Kahan right to conclude that the stakeholder–creditor conflict 
should be addressed by seeking redress from shareholders and other creditors? 
V. SEEKING LEGAL REDRESS FOR WEALTH TRANSFERS 
Adler and Kahan see the problem of wealth transfer against creditors as 
originating with shareholders. While executives might be the people who 
execute the transactions, they are doing so under incentives and encourage-
ment from the firm’s owners. The shareholders should therefore bear the 
consequences of their actions, and it is from shareholders that compensation 
and redress should be sought. For example, where a company pays a dividend 
that undermines the financial resilience of a firm, shareholders might be 
required to return the dividend that contributed to the firm’s failure as 
compensation for the losses that the creditors sustained. This would dis-
courage shareholders from promoting such conduct. Likewise, to the extent 
that firms raise their levels of leverage by issuing additional debt, the new 
creditors who have benefited at the expense of existing ones should be 
required to pay compensation in the event of a corporate failure. New 
creditors should essentially return the benefits they have accrued at the 
expense of existing creditors. 
There is a clear appeal in a proposal that enhances the accountability and 
liability of those responsible for promoting reckless conduct by corpora-
tions. The spirit of the analysis of the financial crisis and the subsequent 
proposed corporate governance reforms described above was that the 
failures are being wrongly ascribed to executives. The shareholders benefited 
from exploiting the put option of shares in their portfolios, and it was they, 
rather than the executives, who therefore promoted excessive risk-taking 
and leverage. One should therefore shoot the originator, not the executor. 
Furthermore, since the wealth transfer problem and the shareholders’ 
put option derive from limited liability, there is an attraction in being able 
to realign incentives and correct distortions by piercing the corporate veil 
and requiring shareholders and the creditors who have enriched themselves 
at the expense of earlier creditors to pay compensation for their ill-begotten 
gains. 
The Adler and Kahan proposals therefore appear to be justified by the 
underlying nature of the failure, the fairness of requiring compensation to 
be paid, and the correction of incentives that it achieves. The sentiment of 
seeking to penalize corporations for their failure to consider the conse-
quences of their actions on adversely affected parties is a worthy one. 
Nevertheless, their proposal is not without its concerns. It will add to the 
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mountain of contractual complexity that already weighs down on corporate 
America. The enforcement of provisions against later creditors and share-
holders would be difficult. To what extent did the issue of subsequent debt 
alleviate or contribute to the ultimate demise of a corporation? Was the 
investment that the firm undertook a fundamental cause of the corporate 
failure? Did shareholders implicitly or explicitly promote the risk-taking 
that failed? These are rich pickings for lawyers but poor prospects for 
corporations.  
It is very unclear whether the right approach to an identified contractual 
or market failure is to find a contractual solution. It might be better to 
recognize that their proposal’s initial failure is to rely on contractual 
approaches as a solution to a problem that is inherently not amenable to 
contractual solutions. It is not a question of whether a contractual resolution 
could be found for the problem—a contractual solution can be found for 
most problems—but whether a contractual remedy is the best or most 
appropriate one.  
The example that Adler and Kahan discuss of a dividend payment that 
left the firm with unreasonably small capital, a form of fraudulent convey-
ance, and a violation of covenant in a loan agreement, is a case in point. If 
the dividend did not leave the firm with unreasonably small capital then it 
might be justified on the grounds that it assisted the firm with raising new 
equity capital. The fact that the firm subsequently failed is not a reason for 
presuming that this was the wrong course of action or could not be justified 
ex post. However, concern about being able to demonstrate this justification 
in a court might discourage a firm from paying the dividend in the first 
place. Furthermore, the notion of requesting a shareholder to return a 
dividend, even within a limited time period, is problematic. The current 
shareholders may not be the same as those who received the dividend, and 
both might be different from those who were shareholders at the time that 
the decision to pay the dividend was made.  
At the heart of the problem lies a failure of the corporation to take 
account of the interests of the parties with whom it is transacting. 
Creditors are but the tip of the iceberg of stakeholders who are exposed to 
excessive risk-taking by the corporation. The ability to impose remedies for 
losses sustained by employees is potentially as significant for the efficient 
operation of the corporation as those incurred by creditors. However, the 
ability to impose retroactive adjustments on other parties, be they share-
holders, later creditors, later employees, or suppliers, is troublesome.  
The generic problem that Rock identifies is one of contractual viola-
tions, which, in the face of financial failure, cannot be rectified except by the 
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types of solutions that Adler and Kahan propose, including seeking direct 
compensation from the offending parties. This threat afflicts a range of 
stakeholders in addition to creditors, and it results in either increases in 
their costs of employment or the entire withdrawal of their services. The 
greatest welfare costs are borne by the stakeholders with the fewest alterna-
tive uses for their services. 
VI. REMEDYING CONTRACTUAL FAILURES 
The failure is one of corporations being able to assure their various con-
stituencies of their commitment to uphold rather than default on agree-
ments. The commitment potentially comes from two quarters: first from the 
owners, the shareholders, and second from their agents, the board of 
directors.  
The level of commitment that shareholders provide is measured in the 
capital that they subscribe to the corporation in the form of retained 
earnings and new equity. As is now widely understood, a fundamental cause 
of the wealth transfers in the financial crisis was the low levels to which 
capital provisions in banks had fallen in the immediate pre-crisis period.17 
Capital is a fundamental requirement for shareholders to be able to demon-
strate credible commitments to their stakeholders. But it is not sufficient. 
The innovation of the corporation was in allowing equity in aggregate to 
be committed through the creation of permanent capital while requiring no 
single shareholder to be committed through the provision of liquid capital 
markets. This system allows shares to be traded in secondary markets while 
leaving the primary funding of corporations unaffected.  
Initially, this had little direct impact on the conduct of firms since the 
majority of equity capital remained under the control of a small number of 
predominantly family owners. Over time, as families sold out, control as 
well as ownership of firms shifted into the hands of investors with no long-
term commitment to the corporation. Therefore, while capital is committed, 
control is not, and increasingly it has passed to shareholders with short 
holding periods. The commitment problem that shareholders face is analogous 
to that of governments, namely, an inability to bind their successors.  
One solution to the shareholder commitment problem is to delegate the 
running of the organization to the board of directors. Some argue that 
boards of directors should perform the function of mediating between the 
 
17 See, e.g., INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON REFORM 
OPTIONS 20-21 (2011) (U.K.) (tracing the causes of the financial crisis in the United Kingdom). 
  
2000 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1989 
 
claims of different parties, thereby providing the commitment to stakeholders 
that short-term shareholders are unable to offer.18  
While in principle boards can perform this function, in practice this 
commitment mechanism has also been undermined by the erosion of the 
board’s delegated authority. This is where corporate governance reforms, in 
seeking to rectify agency problems, have had their most insidious effects. It 
is not simply that they have aggravated creditor–shareholder conflicts; they 
have undermined the ability of boards to provide the commitments to 
stakeholders that short-term shareholders are incapable of supplying. A 
combination of the emergence of markets for corporate control, shareholder 
activism, and reduced periods of executive tenure may have ameliorated 
agency problems, but at the expense of extinguishing the ability of boards of 
directors to offer credible commitments.  
The problem that underlies the emergence of creditor–shareholder con-
flicts that Rock identifies is an erosion of commitment by either shareholders 
or boards of directors, and it afflicts the corporation more generally than 
just in its relations with its creditors. Its emergence has driven Adler and 
Kahan to propose remedies breaching the boundaries of the firm in seeking 
direct redress against offending parties. While this might be appropriate in 
a limited range of circumstances, it is a serious price to pay, and it fails to 
address head on the central question of how to reestablish corporate com-
mitment.  
VII. REESTABLISHING CORPORATE COMMITMENT 
In one sense, the financial crisis was a large contractual failure. No doubt 
there were numerous violations of covenants and collateral requirements, 
and, where there were not, contractual terms could have been made more 
precise. Recovery for losses could have been sought directly from share-
holders or particular classes of creditors. But that misses the point. The 
problem would not and could not have been solved by adjustments to 
contract or methods of enforcing contracts. Nor could it have been corrected 
by public law or regulation alone. Of course there were systemic failures 
that required better and tougher regulation, but the concerns about the 
LIBOR scandal were not essentially about their systemic consequences or 
the need for statutory solutions as against self-regulation. The public 
opprobrium that greeted these events reflected a widespread sense of 
 
18 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role 
of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 410-14 (2001) (discussing how the options theory 
undermines shareholder primacy and the principal–agent model).  
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betrayal of the trust that was placed in organizations that were often 
previously held in high regard. The crisis revealed the extent to which 
corporate attitudes and conduct were motivated by the narrow self-interest 
of the shareholders and executives involved.19 
Trust cannot be created or reestablished through private contract or 
public law, and until both economics and law appreciate this fact and 
address what needs to be done, both fields will err in the nature of the 
policy prescriptions that they propose. At one level, one might believe that 
trust is merely a reflection of the nature and quality of the individuals 
involved. But it is clearly incorrect to suggest that all that is required is to 
have more morally upright shareholders. The nature of organizations 
themselves can promote or undermine their ethical conduct. Institutions 
can have moral characteristics which are at variance from those of the 
individuals involved. To date, we have failed to understand how and why. 
This is an issue I address in depth elsewhere,20 and it would be a distrac-
tion from the subject of the Articles under discussion for me to synthesize 
such a substantial subject here. All that I will do is note that the nature of 
the ownership, board control, and stated values of an organization can bear 
critically on this issue. They determine the extent to which a firm can 
credibly commit to parties such as its creditors. In particular, they point to 
the importance of capital and the volume of capital commitment, as defined 
by the length and breadth as well as depth of capital. Rather than piercing 
the veil to seek redress from shareholders and creditors, they suggest 
strengthening what is held within, rather than outside, the corporate form.  
The problem of the relation of the corporation to its related parties is 
analogous to that of the landlord and tenant. The landlord sees a tenant 
who has no interest in anything other than to trash the property and 
therefore does as little as possible to invest or improve it. The tenant sees a 
landlord whose sole interest is to drive the tenant out at the earliest oppor-
tunity to sell the property at a profit. Both put as little as they can into the 
property. The solution is not to make their other assets liable or to strengthen 
landlord–tenant regulation, but to establish the basis on which both parties 
wish to put as much back into the property as possible. 
The importance of this stems from the fact not only that the alternative 
contractual and regulatory remedies are ultimately infeasible, but also that 
 
19 See Luigi Zingales, The Role of Trust in the 2008 Financial Crisis, 24 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 
235, 246-48 (2011) (linking a loss of trust in financial organizations to exacerbating factors of the 
2008 financial crisis). 
20 COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND 
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013). 
  
2002 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1989 
 
they are undesirable. As noted above, corporations inherently entail bundles 
of conflicts between different parties whose resolution can only be achieved 
at the expense of the interests of particular groups. The way in which these 
conflicts should be resolved varies appreciably depending on the circum-
stances and activities of the organization. Attempts to impose particular 
contractual or regulatory solutions might improve the functioning of some 
organizations, but at the expense of others. 
So, for example, while the primary deficiency of the U.K. economy, and 
possibly to a lesser extent the U.S. economy, is one of commitment and 
short-termism of shareholders, that is not the main problem of most 
continental European or Asian economies. Their greater concerns are with 
the conflict between dominant and minority investors, rather than between 
short- and long-term shareholders. In many developing economies, protec-
tion of other stakeholders, including the claims of creditors and the rights of 
employees, is a more substantial issue. Attempts to suggest that there are 
universal panaceas are destined to fail. Even within countries, there is a 
need for variety rather than homogeneity of solutions and corporate forms. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Rock is exactly right in concluding that there is a need to 
rebalance the corporate governance and law debate away from the agency 
problem. He is also right in suggesting that the shareholder–creditor 
conflict is another major issue that needs attention and may well have been 
exacerbated by a preoccupation with the shareholder–manager conflict. 
Indeed, the nature of the issue which Rock is raising is broader still than 
shareholder–creditor conflicts and encompasses a wide range of other 
parties to the firm, some of whom are more vulnerable than creditors. 
Adler and Kahan are also right in pointing to contractual default and the 
inability of firms to make amends in the presence of financial failure as 
lying at the heart of the problem. Indeed, since the problem of contractual 
failure is so pervasive and impinges on so many parties, not just particular 
classes of creditors, seeking ways of reducing their frequency and mitigating 
their consequences is of critical importance. Rather than devising mecha-
nisms for affected parties to seek redress for losses, we should address the 
problem at its source and examine institutional mechanisms for promoting 
confidence and trust between the relevant parties to the firm. This approach 
emphasizes the need to strengthen what resides within, as well as what can 
be claimed outside, the boundaries of the firm. 
